In February 2022, many assumed that by bringing its full conventional capabilities to bear, Russia would make relatively short work of Ukraine’s standing military.
It had modernised its armed forces extensively in the decade before, ostensibly well-equipped and trained for combined arms warfare – particularly in the air, fielding hundreds of modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30, Su-35, MiG-31, and Su-34.
But for several reasons now well documented, Russia underperformed in key areas such as logistics, precision strike targeting, suppression of enemy air defence and interdiction, and to this day the Ukrainian Air Force demonstrates tenacity, continuing sorties with its shrinking fleet of Soviet-era jets: MiG-29, Su-25, Su-24 and Su-27.
Some of these have seen crude modifications to mount Western equipment and armaments such as the AGM-88 HARM antiradar missile, and MBDA’s Storm Shadow cruise missile.
Donations from other ex-communist nations such as Poland and Macedonia have bolstered the Soviet jet force, but over time and after much political wrangling, Ukraine has begun its transition to a Western fighter fleet, with roughly 80 of Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Falcon jets pledged from various partners, and around a dozen now finally in-country as of 4 August.
Affectionately known as the ‘Viper’ by its pilots, the F-16 was developed from the US’ experience in the Vietnam War.
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It is a lightweight, agile, and flexible jet designed as a true multirole, able to carry a vast array of Western air-to-air, air-to-ground and antiship armaments.
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By GlobalDataBeing a popular choice in Western militaries, Ukraine will benefit from a large network of logistical support, spare parts, ammunition, and technical know-how from partners.
It is better suited to using some weapons already given to Ukraine, including the AGM-88, with more effective targeting methods.
The first examples seen flying over Ukraine are donated from the Netherlands and Denmark and are ‘mid-life upgrades’ of the older Block 15 variant, incorporating avionics, weapons, and performance improvements from newer Viper versions onto the ageing airframes.
There had been much speculation regarding the specific capabilities Ukraine’s jets would be permitted to carry by Western partners, but now a clearer picture is emerging.
Crucially, images from Ukraine show the jets have been equipped with a family of defensive upgrades: the Electronic Combat Integrated Pylon System from Elbit and Terma, the AN/ALQ-162 jammer from Northrop Grumman, and the AN/AAR-60 missile warning system from Hensoldt.
Together, these systems are a strong defensive suite designed to counter modern Russian surface-to-air and air-to-air missile threats such as the S300/400 and R-77.
The air domain in Ukraine is highly contested and far more dangerous than most that Western militaries have operated in during recent conflicts, meaning these additions are crucial for the F-16’s survivability.
For offensive armaments, Ukraine has received the AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking short-range air-to-air missile, and the longer-range AIM-120 AMRAAM active radar air-to-air missile.
Compared to Ukraine’s previous options in air combat – older variants of the R-27, R-77 and R-73 – these are substantial upgrades.
It is also known that Ukrainian Viper pilots are equipped with Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems, enabling an efficient and intuitive release of high off-boresight missile shots.
For ground attack, the list of options is extensive but includes HARMs, JDAMs, Zuni and Hydra rockets, SDBs, and Paveways.
Ukrainian diplomats can be expected to make a fresh push now for Western cruise missiles compatible with the Viper such as the JASSM or SLAM.
This is a step change for the Ukrainian Air Force, but observers anticipating a dramatic overnight shift in the air war will need to temper expectations.
There remain several challenges and limitations.
Firstly, the AN/APG-68 pulse doppler radar carried by the Vipers Ukraine is receiving, whilst an upgrade from the MiG-29 and Su-27, is still (on paper) outclassed in detection ranges by Russia’s best fighters such as the Su-35, especially when aided by AWACS aircraft.
It is important to consider that some capabilities may be deliberately masked for the time being, but visual evidence suggests Ukraine has so far been denied access to the AIM-9X and AMRAAM-D, the most recent marks of each respective missile.
The ‘D’ AMRAAM has a classified but estimated range of around 180km along with several guidance upgrades, and the 9X uses thrust vectoring.
Both are lethal improvements on already capable weapons, designed specifically to deal with the highest-end threats from Russian aviation – but Ukraine’s jets have so far only been seen with the older AIM-9 L/M, and a ‘C’ variant of the AMRAAM, likely the C-5 or C-7.
Whilst more survivable than older Soviet jets, flying near the frontline will still be fraught with risk, as Russian air defenses are extensive and designed from the ground up to deal with Western-made jets.
In Nato militaries, the F-16 would be expected to operate only as part of a larger force, including AWACS, extensive electronic warfare systems, and several other combat aircraft of varying capabilities.
Ukraine will not have that luxury: its Viper numbers will trickle in slowly over the coming months and even years, and they will likely be forced to fly low and approach the frontlines rarely to avoid air defences and the long-range Russian fighters that outnumber and may still outrange them.
From lower down, beyond-visual-range engagement with aircraft is inherently more difficult, with a lower probability-of-kill owing to the missile fighting against both gravity and range.
Ukraine may have its first pilots on call, but its learning is far from over.
There will still be much to absorb regarding tactics and procedures that can only fully mature as combat operations progress.
Lastly, those monitoring the conflict closely will know that in recent months Russia has demonstrated an improved ‘sensor-to-shooter’ kill chain: it is employing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets such as drones in concert with its long-range strike capabilities far more effectively than in the earlier stages of the war, leading to a concerning uptick in visually confirmed losses of Ukrainian helicopters and jets on the ground beyond the frontline.
This has been exacerbated by an ongoing shortage of Ukrainian air defence munitions and electronic warfare systems.
This means that protecting the F-16s on the ground will be an ongoing challenge, as they will certainly be a priority target.
In light of these pros and cons, what can we expect to see from the Viper in Ukraine over the coming months?
To begin with, combat operations are certain to remain both highly cautious and defensive, and primarily focus on bolstering defences against Russia’s cruise missile and drone strike campaign.
These ‘defensive counter-air’ missions will aim to protect Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure and may include tentative approaches towards the frontline to at least deter low-flying Russian close air support jets from attacking Ukrainian ground forces – though this remains to be seen.
Flying low and being held at constant risk of attack when on the ground means operations will likely be as dispersed as possible, with small elements scattered across several refuelling and rearming points on Ukrainian territory. There has been discussion on making use of Romanian airfields.
It is difficult to determine whether Russian aircraft may seek out direct engagement with Vipers to score propaganda victories, or if fear of the renowned AMRAAM and the F-16’s manoeuvrability will act as a deterrent, in turn frustrating Ukraine’s need to assert greater control of the air battle without ranging into more dangerous skies.
What may drive a desire on Ukraine’s part to take greater risks over time is the pressing need to counter the threat of Russia’s glide bomb attacks.
Ranging from 500kg to three tons for recent models, these conversions of older bombs are a cheap and scalable method for Russian jets to deliver heavy firepower from ranges of 40-60km.
Ukraine currently has no reliable countermeasure, and they are having a devastating effect on the frontline, tearing apart entrenched positions, killing or incapacitating dozens of soldiers at a time and having a psychological impact on survivors.
Scores of civilians in settlements close to the front have also been killed. At times, Russia has been dropping up to 300 a week.
But a proper response with F-16s means climbing to an altitude close to the line of contact to take Russian aircraft more or less head-on with AMRAAMs, provoking a risky challenge from hostile fighters and air defences.
As for ground attack, F-16 mission profiles will likely be similarly reserved, probably employing the maximum stand-off range for weapons such as the JDAM.
If a decision is made to supply more weapon systems such as the JASSM, it can also fulfil a potent role in stand-off strikes currently performed by Su-24s armed with the Storm Shadow, targeting high-value Russian assets from safer distances – 370km for the base JASSM, and up to 1,000km for the ‘ER’ variant.
When an air force adopts a new aircraft, the upgrade is better understood as a gradual, incremental transition rather than an immediate shift.
As mentioned, it will take time for pilots, ground crews and command staff to develop a strong familiarity and tempo for the new ‘concept of operations’ that comes with the F-16.
In the words of a former US Viper pilot, “if you take an F-16 and fly it like a MiG-29, all you have is a faster MiG-29”.
Best employment of some of the F-16’s better qualities compared to Ukraine’s older jets will only be fully matured through combat experience, which comes with its own risks.
Some lessons may be learnt ‘the hard way’.
Another promising factor in the longer run is Sweden’s donation of ASC-890 AWACS aircraft, with a greater radar range than the Viper.
Its datalink with the F-16 would be a boon to situational awareness and decision-making that can enable smarter, safer, and more successful engagement with Russian aircraft.
In summary, the Viper is not the ‘kryptonite’ that will turn the tide singlehandedly.
Fearing technology falling into the wrong hands, or as part of an ‘escalation management’ strategy, the West has refrained from supplying the most cutting-edge systems such as AESA radars and the latest weapon variants.
Nevertheless, it constitutes a new chapter for the Ukrainian Air Force with improved capabilities that its leadership knows they will have to nurture and expand over time.
As political tides shift, it is possible they will be furnished with weapons that will expand stand-off strike distances to include more Russian targets on the ground, most crucially logistical nodes and the Russian jets delivering glide bombs.
In this war, Ukraine has frequently proved resourceful and adaptive whilst Russia has struggled through institutional rigidity, often learning lessons in force employment and protection only after high-profile losses.
The development of tactics for the F-16 in this environment has much room to evolve.
2024 marks the 50th anniversary of the F-16’s first flight.
Since then, it has been successfully employed and revered in air forces the world over, with a commendable combat record.
But even at this age, in Ukraine the jet faces perhaps its largest test since its creation.
If the Ukrainian Air Force can grow into its new capabilities and expand them as the war continues, the Viper may eventually become one of several key factors in the final outcome.
